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Abstract
In this paper the problem of sharing the cost of emission in supply
chains is considered. (Gopalakrishnan et al, 2017) focus on alloca-
tion problems that can be described by rooted trees, called cost-tree
problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games,
called upstream responsibility games. This paper generalizes the for-
mal notion of upstream responsibility games to a non-tree model, and
provides two (primal and dual) characterizations of the class of these
games. Axiomatizations of the Shapley value under both characteri-
zations are also provided.
This is a followup paper of Radva´nyi (2018); Pinte´r and Radva´nyi
(2019).
Keywords: Upstream responsibility games; Cost sharing; Emis-
sion; Supply chain; Shapley value; Axiomatization of the Shapley
value.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider cost sharing problems related to supply chains.
We assign transferable utility (TU) cooperative games (henceforth games) to
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these cost sharing problems. Specializing the problem, we consider energy
supply chains with a motivated dominant leader, who has the power to assign
the suppliers responsibilities for both direct and indirect emissions. The in-
duced games are called upstream responsibility games (Gopalakrishnan et al,
2017).
For an example consider a supply chain where we look at the responsibility
allocation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission among the firms in the chain.
One of the main questions is how to share the costs related to the emission
among the firms. The supply chain and the related firms (or any other actors)
in Gopalakrishnan et al (2017) are represented by a rooted tree.
The root of the tree represents the end product produced by the supply
chain. The root is connected to only one node which is the leader of the
chain. Each further node represents one firm, and the edges of the rooted tree
represent the producing process among the firms with the related emissions.
The goal is to share the responsibility of the emission while embodying the
principle of upstream emission responsibility.
In this paper we rely on the TU-game model of Gopalakrishnan et al
(2017), called GHG Responsibility-Emissions and Environment (GREEN)
game. Gopalakrishnan et al use the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) as an
allocation method, consider some pollution related properties that an emis-
sion allocation rule should meet, and provide several axiomatizations as well.
In contrast we generalize the model of the upstream responsibility games
to a non-tree approach, which model relies on the responsibility matrix of
the emission of pollutants. We offer two characterizations of the general-
ized model, using the unanimity games on the one hand and the duals of
the unanimity games on the other hand. In both cases we provide different
axiomatizations of the Shapley value as well.
The setup of this paper is as follows: in the following section we introduce
the notions and notations, then we define the upstream responsibility game in
the special case where the supply chain can be represented by a rooted tree.
In Section 3 we generalize our model behind the supply chain, that is, we
characterize the class of upstream responsibility games where a graph is no
longer needed to be a rooted tree, instead we use the so called responsibility
matrix which allows for non-tree structures too. In Section 4 we introduce
the axiomatizations we use for the Shapley value on the class of (generalized)
upstream responsibility games.
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2 Upstream Responsibility Games
2.1 Preliminaries
Notions, notations : #N is for the cardinality of set N , and 2N denotes the
class of all subsets of N . A ⊂ B means A ⊆ B, but A 6= B. A unionmulti B stands
for the union of disjoint sets A and B.
A graph is a pair G = (V,E), where the elements of V are called vertices
or nodes, and E stands for the ordered pairs of vertices, called edges or arcs.
A rooted tree is a graph in which any two vertices are connected by exactly one
path, and one vertex has been designated the root denoted as node root. In
the case of a supply chain consisting several entities, which are cooperating in
the production of a final product, the manufacturing process can be modeled
with a directed rooted tree. The set of nodes V represents the entities,
henceforth players, and a directed arc emanating from node i towards root
represents the activity by player i contributing to the manufacturing of the
final product. We assume that only one node emanates arc enters the root,
this emanates from node 1 which node represents the end consumer.
The tree-order is the partial ordering on the vertices of a rooted tree with
i ≤ j, if the unique path from j to the root passes through i. The chain is a
rooted tree such that any vertices i, j ∈ V , i ≤ j or j ≤ i. That is, a chain
is a rooted tree with only one ”branch”. For any pair e ∈ E, e = ij means
e is an edge between vertices i, j ∈ V such that i ≤ j. For each i ∈ V , let
Si(G) = {j ∈ V : j ≥ i}, that is, for any i ∈ V , i ∈ Si(G). For each i ∈ V
let Pi(G) = {j ∈ V : j ≤ i}, that is, for any i ∈ V , i ∈ Pi(G). Moreover,
for any V ′ ⊆ V , let (PV ′(G), EV ′) be the sub-rooted-tree of (V,E), where
PV ′(G) = ∪i∈V ′Pi(G) and EV ′ = {ij ∈ E : i, j ∈ PV ′(G)}.
Let c : E → R+, c and (G, c) are called cost function and cost-tree re-
spectively. An interpretation of cost tree (G, c) might be as follows: there
is a given product which is produced by a supply chain. V = N ∪ {root},
N denotes the set of all entities of the supply process. We assume that only
one arc emanates form the root and this emanates from the node 1. Node 1,
the only node from which an arc goes to the root denotes the end-consumer,
and the leaf nodes represents the most upstream members (that is, firms,
etc.) of the supply chain. Each edge e ∈ E is associated with a process in
the supply chain emitting a pollution c(e). Let ei denote the unique edge in
the tree T emanating from node i (in the direction of the root). In this case
c(ei) represents the direct pollution associated with ei, the directly created
pollution by node (firm) i. Besides i also can be responsible for the pollution
of other processes in the chain. For each node i, Ei denotes the set of edges
whose associated pollution is the direct or indirect responsibility of node i.
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Let N 6= ∅, #N <∞, and v : 2N → R be a function such that v(∅) = 0.
Then N , v are called set of players, and transferable utility cooperative game
(henceforth game) respectively. The class of games with player set N is
denoted by GN .
A game v ∈ GN is convex, if for all S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪
T ) + v(S ∩ T ), moreover, it is concave, if for all S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≥
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
The dual of a game v ∈ GN is a game v¯ ∈ GN such that for all S ⊆ N ,
v¯(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S). It is well known that the dual of a convex game is
a concave game and vice versa.
Let v ∈ GN and i ∈ N , and v′i(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S), where S ⊆ N .
The vector v′i is called player i’s marginal contribution function in game v.
Alternatively, v′i(S) is player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S in game
v.
Let v ∈ GN , the players i, j ∈ N are equivalent in game v, i ∼v j, if for
all S ⊆ N such that i, j /∈ S, v′i(S) = v′j(S).
Let N and T ∈ 2N \ ∅, and for all S ⊆ N , let
uT (S) =
{
1, if T ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
The game uT is called unanimity game on coalition T .
In this paper we also use the duals of the unanimity games. For any
T ∈ 2N \ ∅ and for all S ⊆ N ,
u¯T (S) =
{
1, if T ∩ S 6= ∅,
0 otherwise.
It is clear that every unanimity game is convex, and the duals of the
unanimity games are concave.
Henceforth, we assume that in the considered cost-tree problems there
are at least two players, that is, #V ≥ 3 and #N ≥ 2.
2.2 The TU-game model for trees
In the following we introduce the notion of upstream responsibility games
(URG) (Gopalakrishnan et al, 2017). Let (G, c) be a cost-tree, representing
a supply chain, and N be the set of the members of the chain, henceforth
players (the vertices but the root). We denote by aj the pollution associated
with arc j. Let c({i}) denote the total pollution emission that player i
is directly or indirectly responsible for. Ei represents the set of edges whose
associated pollution is the direct or indirect responsibility of player i, c({i}) =
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a(Ei) =
∑
j∈Ei aj. For every S ⊆ N let ES denote the collection of edges whose
associated pollution is the direct or indirect responsibility of the players in
S, thus ES = ∪i∈SEi and the pollution which S is directly or indirectly
responsible for is as follows c(S) = a(ES) =
∑
j∈ES aj.
Definition 1 (Upstream Responsibility Game). For any cost-tree (G, c), let
N = V \ {root} be the player set, and for any coalition S (the empty sum is
0) let the upstream responsibility game be defined as follows
v(G,c)(S) =
∑
j∈ES
aj .
Let GG denote the subclass of upstream responsibility games induced by
cost-tree problems on a (specific) rooted tree G.
The next example is an illustration of the above definition.
Example 2. Consider the cost-tree in Figure 1, where the rooted tree G =
(V,E) is as follows, V = {root, 1, 2, 3}, A = {root1, 12, 13}, and the cost
(pollution) function c is defined as c(root1) = a1 = 2, c(12) = a2 = 4 and
c(13) = a3 = 1. E1 = {e1, e2, e3}, E2 = {e2}, E3 = {e3}.
Figure 1: The cost-tree (G, c)
The upstream responsibility game v(G,c) = (0, 7, 4, 1, 7, 7, 5, 7), that is,
v(G,c)(∅) = 0, v(G,c)({1}) = 7, v(G,c)({2}) = 4, v(G,c)({3}) = 1, v(G,c)({1, 2}) =
7, v(G,c)({1, 3}) = 7, v(G,c)({2, 3}) = 5 and v(G,c)(N) = 7. (In this example
we assume that for any rooted tree G the associated pollutions sets are as
follows Ei = Pi(G), i ∈ V \ {root}.)
In the following section we generalize the model of the upstream respon-
sibility games, in the sense that the game depends only on the responsibility
matrix meaning the graph structure is not necessarily a tree. That is we
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only need to know which player is responsible for which process in the sup-
ply chain, and no graph is needed to describe the connection, so in this case
we get a more generalized model.
3 Characterization of the class of upstream
responsibility games
This section is devoted to defining and analyzing the class of upstream re-
sponsibility games. First we define the notion of upstream responsibility
game, then in two subsections we give two characterizations of this class, one
by the unanimity games, and one by the duals of the unanimity games.
Assume that the class of processes M and the responsibility matrix B,
which is an |N | × |M | binary matrix, bi,j = 1 means Player i is responsible
for process j and bi,j = 0 means Player i is not responsible for process j, are
given. Each process k ∈ M involves footprint or cost of the activities the
process defines, it is denoted by a non-negative scalar fk. Then we can define
a TU-game, an upstream responsibility game as follows:
Definition 3. Let F := {fk}k∈M , fk ≥ 0, k ∈M , B |N |×|M | binary matrix
are given. Then for each S ⊆ N let
vB,F (S) :=
∑
f∈∪i∈SPi
f,
where Pi := {fk ∈ F : bi,k = 1}.
Notice that vB,F ∈ GN .
Let GNUR denote the class of upstream responsibility games with players set
N .
In words, the value of a coalition is the sum of the footprints the players
from the coalition are responsible for. We assume that at least one player is
responsible for each process. Notice that the upstream responsibility games
are cost games, the higher the value of a coalition the worse the position of
the coalition (it involves more cost).
3.1 The primal characterization of the class of upstream
responsibility games
Next we give a characterization of the upstream responsibility games. This
characterization is based on the unanimity games.
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Corollary 4. For any upstream responsibility game v ∈ GN it holds that
v =
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|T |+1
 ∑
f∈∩i∈TPi
f
uT . (1)
Formula (1) is very intuitive, this practically is a sieve formula, and its
validity comes directly from Definition 3.
Next we give the class of upstream responsibility games.
Lemma 5. Let v ∈ GN be a game, and v = ∑T∈N αTuT . Then v is an
upstream responsibility game if and only if
1. T ⊆ S implies |αT | ≥ |αS|,
2. αT > 0 if and only if |T | is even,
3. αT < 0 if and only if |T | is odd.
Proof. It is the direct corollary of Formula (1). 
Lemma 5 also says that any subgame of an upstream responsibililty game
is an upstream responsibility game.
In the following proposition we show that every upstream responsibility
game is totally balanced, meaning it is always possible to allocate the total
footprint, the total cost of the supply chain, among the players in a stable
way.
Proposition 6. Every upstream responsibility game is totally balanced, but
there exist non-negative totally balanced games which are not upstream re-
sponsibility games.
Proof. Notice that because of Lemma 5 it is enough to consider a general
upstream responsibility game.
Take an upstream responsibility game vB,F ∈ GN , and for each i ∈ N let
xi :=
∑
T⊆N
i∈T
∑
f∈(∩j∈TPj)\(∪j∈N\TPj)
f
|T | . (2)
Let S ⊆ N , then
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∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
∑
T⊆N
i∈T
∑
f∈(∩j∈TPj)\(∪j∈N\TPj)
f
|T |
≤
∑
i∈S
∑
f∈Pi
f =
∑
f∈∪i∈SPi
f = vB,F (S).
Let N = {1, 2}, v ∈ GN be defined as v = u{1} − uN . It is easy to check
that v is totally balanced, and by Lemma 5 v /∈ GNUR, that is, v is not an
upstream responsibility game. 
Finally, by Lemma 5 we have that the class of upstream responsibility
games is a convex cone. It is worth noticing that when we consider GNUR then
the set of process M , the footprints F and the responsibility matrix B are
not fixed, those can vary.
Corollary 7. The class of upstream responsibility games is a convex cone.
3.2 The dual characterization of the class of upstream
responsibility games
Next we give another characterization of the upstream responsibility games.
This characterization is based on the duals of the unanimity games. (For the
special case on trees see the results of Radva´nyi (2018).)
Corollary 8. For any upstream responsibility game v ∈ GN it holds that
v =
∑
k∈M
T :={i∈N : bi,k=1}
fku¯T . (3)
The formula (1) is very expressive, it says that each coalition must cover
the cost its subgroups are responsible for exclusively. Since M , B and F can
vary widely we have the following characterization of the class of upstream
responsibility games:
Proposition 9. The class of upstream responsibility games GNUR is the convex
cone spanned by the duals of the unanimity games.
Proof. It is the direct corollary of Corollary 8. 
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Again, Proposition 8 says also that any subgame of an upstream respon-
sibility game is an upstream responsibility game. Moreover, since the core of
any non-negative weighted sum of the duals of the unanimity games are not
empty, we have that
Proposition 10. The class of upstream responsibility games is a proper sub-
set of the class of totally balanced games.
4 Axiomatization of the Shapley value
In this section we consider various characterizations of the Shapley value
on the class of upstream responsibility games. We split this section into two
subsections. In the first one we consider two axiomatizations which are based
on the characterization of upstream responsibility game by Corollary 4. In
the second one, very similarly, we consider an axiomatization which is based
on the characterization of upstream responsibility game by Proposition 8.
For an analogy to the case of trees see Pinte´r and Radva´nyi (2019).
4.1 The Shapley value and the core
First let us define the two following solution concepts which provide solutions
for sharing the cost of emissions.
A solution on set A ⊆ GN ψ is a set-valued mapping ψ : A  RN , that
is, a solution assign a set of allocations to each game. In the following, we
define two solutions.
Let v ∈ GN and
piSh(S) =

#S!(#(N \ S)− 1)!
#N !
, if i /∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Then φi(v) the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i in game v is the p
i
Sh
expected value of v′i. In other words
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
v′i(S) p
i
Sh(S) . (4)
Furthermore, let φ denote the Shapley value.
It is obvious from its definition that the Shapley solution is a single valued
solution, a single valued solution is called value.
Next, we introduce an other solution, the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies,
1959). Let v ∈ GNUR be an upstream responsibility game. Then the core of
upstream responsibility game v is defined as follows
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core (v) =
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), and for any S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S)
}
.
The core consists of the stable allocations of the value of the grand coali-
tion, that is, any allocation of the core is such that the allocated cost is the
total cost (
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)) and no coalition has incentive to deviate from
the allocation scheme.
A game is balanced if its core is not empty, moreover it is totally balanced
if the core of any of its subgames is not empty.
4.2 Axiomatizations based on the primal representa-
tion
First we introduce the axioms we use in this subsection to characterize the
Shapley value.
Definition 11. A value ψ on the class of games A ⊆ GN meets
• PO (Pareto Optimality or Efficiency), if ∑i∈N ψi(v) = v(N), v ∈ A,
• ETP (Equal Treatment Property), if for each pair i, j ∈ N such that
i ∼v j it holds that ψi(v) = ψj(v),
• NN (Non-negativity), if for all v ∈ A such that v ≥ 0 it holds that
ψ(v) ≥ 0,
• CSE (Coalitional Strategic Equivalence), if for all v ∈ A, α > 0 and
T ∈ N such that v + αuT ∈ A it holds that ψi(v + αuT ) = ψi(v),
i ∈ N \ T .
• WFP (Weak Fairness Property), if for all v ∈ A, α > 0, T ∈ N such
that v + αuT ∈ A for all i, j ∈ T it holds that ψi(v + αuT ) − ψi(v) =
ψj(v + αuT )− ψj(v).
The first three axioms (PO, ETP and NN) are considered from the be-
ginning of the axiomatizations of the Shapley value. The axiom CSE was
introduced by Chun (1989). We differ here from Chun’s definition but the
difference does not deserve to look into the details. The last axiom (WFP)
is a new axiom, it is a weakening of the axiom FP (Fairness Property) by
van den Brink (2001). The difference between WFP and FP is that FP is ap-
plied to cases where instead of αuT can be any game, and the considered two
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players are equivalent in the game. It is clear that WFP is a real weakening
of FP, but it is very similar in spirit to FP.
Our first characterization theorem is the refinement of Young (1985) and
Chun (1989).
Theorem 12. A value on the class of upstream responsibility games GNUR
meets the axioms PO, ETP, CSE and WFP if and only if it is the Shapley
value.
Proof. The Shapley value meets the axioms PO, ETP, CSE and WFP: It is
left for the reader.
Suppose that ψ is a value on GNUR such that it meets the axioms PO, ETP,
CSE and WFP. The proof goes by induction on N(v) := |{αT : αT 6= 0}|,
where v :=
∑
T∈N αTuT and N := {T ⊆ N : T 6= ∅}.
If N(v) = 0, meaning v = 0, then by PO and ETP ψi(v) = 0, i ∈ N , that
is, ψ is well-defined.
Suppose that ψ is well-defined for each game v ∈ GNUR such that N(v) = k.
Take a game v ∈ GNUR such that N(v) = k + 1. Take a maximal element T ∗
from {T ∈ N : αT 6= 0} (v :=
∑
T∈N αTuT ). Then by Lemma 5 w :=∑
T∈N\{T ∗} αTuT is an upstream responsibility game, and N(w) = k, hence
by the induction hypothesis ψ is well-defined at w.
If i /∈ T ∗, then by the axiom CSE we have that ψ(v)i = ψ(w)i, that is,
ψ(v)i is well-defined.
For all i, j ∈ T ∗ by the axiom WFP we have that ψi(v + αuT )− ψi(v) =
ψj(v+αuT )−ψj(v), meaning we have a system of independent linear equal-
ities with degree of freedom 1. Then by that ψ(v)i is well-defined for each
i /∈ T ∗ we have that ∑i∈T ∗ ψ(v)i is well-defined, therefore, we we have a
system of independent linear equalities with degree of freedom 0, meaning
ψ(v) is well-defined.
Since the Shapley value meets the axioms PO, ETP, CSE and WFP we
have that ψ is the Shapley value. 
Next, by means of examples we demonstrate that in Theorem 12 the
axioms are independent.
Example 13. PO is missing: Take the value which is the double of the Shapley
value. Then it is easy to see that this value meets the axioms ETP, CSE and
WFP.
ETP is missing: Let N = {1, 2} and ψ be the Shapley value plus (1,−1).
Then it is easy to see that this value meets the axioms PO, CSE and WFP.
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CSE is missing: Let ψ(v) = v(N)|N | , v ∈ GNUR (egalitarian rule). Then it is
easy to see that this value meets the axioms PO, ETP and WFP.
WFP is missing: Let i∗ ∈ N be a player, and let ψ be such that for each
v ∈ GNUR
ψ(v) :=

Sh(v), if ∃i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, i ∼v−αNuN j or
αN = 0,
Sh(v − αNuN) + αNχ{i∗} otherwise,
where Sh is the Shapley value and χ{i∗} is the characteristic vector of {i∗}.
If v is such that @i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, i ∼v−αNuN j and αN 6= 0, then ETP
does not matter at v, and CSE does not matter between v and v + βNuN
for any β ∈ R \ {0}. Moreover, by Lemma 5 the property of @i, j ∈ N ,
i 6= j, i ∼v−αNuN j is equivalent with @i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, i ∼v−αNuN+βTuT j,
T ∈ N \ {N}, β ∈ R and v + βTuT ∈ GNUR.
Therefore, this value meets the axioms PO, ETP and CSE.
Next we show that we can change ETP to NN in Theorem 12.
Theorem 14. A value on the class of upstream responsibility games (the
players set is N) meets the axioms PO, NN, CSE and WFP if and only if it
is the Shapley value.
Proof. The Shapley value meets the axiom NN: It is left for the reader.
In the proof of Theorem 12 we used the axiom only at the step showing
that ψ(0) = 0. Notice that by PO and NN we also have that ψ(0) = 0.
Therefore we can apply the proof of Theorem 12 with this minor modification.

Next, by means of examples we demonstrate that the axioms are inde-
pendent in Theorem 14.
Example 15. PO is missing: See Example 13.
NN is missing: See the ETP is missing example in Example 13.
CSE is missing: See Example 13.
WFP is missing: Let i∗ ∈ N be a player, and let ψ be such that for each
v ∈ GNUR
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ψ(v) :=

Sh(v), if α{i∗} = 0,
Sh
(
v − ∑
i∗∈T
αTuT
)
+ (v(N)− v(N \ {i∗})χ{i∗} otherwise.
It is clear that ψ meets PO and NN. Moreover, let i ∈ N \ {i∗} and
S ⊆ N \ {i}. Then if i∗ /∈ S, then ψ(v)i = Sh
(
v −∑i∗∈T αTuT )i =
Sh
(
v + βSuS −
∑
i∗∈T αTuT
)
i
= ψ(v+ βSuS)i, βS ∈ R such that v+ βSuS ∈
GNUR. If i∗ ∈ S, then even v −
∑
i∗∈T αTuT = v + βSuS −
∑
i∗∈T αTuT , that
is, ψ(v)i = ψ(v + βSuS)i, βS ∈ R such that v + βSuS ∈ GNUR.
Let S ⊆ N \ {i∗}. Then ψ(v){i∗} = (v(N)− v(N \ {i∗}) = (v(N) + βS −
v(N \ {i∗} − βS) = ψ(v + βSuS){i∗}, βS ∈ R such that v + βSuS ∈ GNUR.
Therefore, this value meets the axioms PO, NN and CSE.
4.3 An axiomatization based on the dual representa-
tion
Next we introduce a further axiom we use in this subsection.
Definition 16. A value ψ on the class of games A ⊆ GN meets
• DCSE (Dual Coalitional Strategic Equivalence), if for all v ∈ A, α > 0
and T ∈ N such that v + αu¯T ∈ A it holds that ψi(v + αu¯T ) = ψi(v),
i ∈ N \ T .
The DCSE axiom is a dual version of CSE by Chun (1989), meaning,
while CSE applies when the difference between two games is measured by an
unanimity game, the DCSE applies when the difference between two games
is measured by a dual of an unanimity game.
Proposition 8 implies the following result:
Theorem 17. A value on the class of upstream responsibility games GN
meets the axioms PO, ETP and DCSE if and only if it is the Shapley value.
Proof. The goes as in Young (1985) or Chun (1989). 
It is straightforward to check the independence of the axioms in Theorem
17, the egalitarian rule meets PO and ETP, the double Shapley meets ETP
and DCSE, and the Shapley plus a non-zero but zero-sum vector meets PO
and DCSE.
For that in this case we cannot change ETP for NN see the following
example:
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Example 18. Let i∗ ∈ N be a player, and let ψ be such that for each v ∈ GNUR
ψ(v) :=
{
Sh(v), if αN = 0,
Sh(v − αN u¯N) + αNχ{i∗} otherwise.
It is clear that ψ meets PO and NN. Let i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \{i}. If i 6= i∗,
then ψ(v)i = Sh(v − αN u¯N)i = Sh(v + βSu¯S − αN u¯N)i = ψ(v + βSuS)i,
βS ∈ R. If i = i∗, then ψ(v)i∗ = ψ(v − αNuN)i∗ + αNχi∗ = ψ(v + βSu¯S −
αNuN)i∗ + αNχ{i∗} = ψ(v + βSu¯S)i∗ , βS ∈ R, that is, ψ meets the axioms
PO, NN and DCSE.
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